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ARTICLE 81 OF THE
MENTAL HYGIENE LAW:*
DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE ELDERLY,
BUT PREJUDICING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
Rosann Torres**
Guardianship' is a trust of the most sacred character
From the Guardian the law exacts absolute fidelity and
will be satisfied with nothing less.2
INTRODUCTION
Article 81 of New York's Mental Hygiene Law3 was enacted
as a result of heated debate concerning the abusive powers
* N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81 (McKinney 1997).
Brooklyn Law School Class of 1999; B.A. Georgetown University, 1993.
The author wishes to extend a heartfelt thank you to her parents and brothers for
their continual support and to Randy Torres for his love and encouragement.
"Guardianship" is the "office, duty or authority, given by a [c]ourt [o]rder
to [a] [g]uardian [and] may be referred to as the total property and assets coming
under the authority of the [g]uardian." Leona Beane, Glossary for Guardians:
Key Words, Terms, Phrases and Concepts, in GUARDIANSHIP LAW: ARTICLE 81 -
1997 TRAINING TO OBTAIN CERTIFICATION, 1997, 247, 257 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. D-258, 1997).
2 In re Bond, 297 N.Y.S. 493, 497 (App. Div. 1937).
' N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81 (establishing the procedure for the
appointment of a guardian for the personal needs or property management of a
judicially declared incapacitatedperson). Article 81 states that a guardian of the
person is appointed by the court to provide for the personal needs of the
incapacitatedperson. Id. § 81.22. The powers of a guardian of the person include
many provisions that are rendered absurd when the statute is applied to children.
For example, the guardian of the person is empowered to determine whether the
incapacitated person should possess a license to drive. Id. § 81.22(4). Also, a
guardian of the property is appointed by the court with authority to manage the
property and financial affairs of the incapacitated person. Id. § 81.21.
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exercised by court-appointed conservators4 and committees 5 over
the person and property of their elderly wards 6 under Articles 77
and 78 of the Mental Hygiene Law.7 Under these repealed
guardianship statutes, an elderly person's due process rights were
frequently violated by a judiciary which often took over three
months to appoint a conservator or committee to manage his or her
affairs.8 Additionally, in Article 77 and 78 hearings, the guardian
4 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77 (McKinney 1988) (repealed 1993)
(defining a conservator as a person appointed by the court to manage the money
and property of an incapacitatedperson); see also In re Cantor, 363 N.Y.S.2d 79,
79 (Sur. Ct. 1975) (granting petitioner, who had been appointed as a conservator
under Article 77, letters of administration of the estate of the conservatee's
brother). The Cantor court outlined the powers of the Article 77 conservator:
Article 77 of the Mental Hygiene Law enacted in 1972 has many
beneficent purposes. The most important is to provide property
management for those persons who fall short of qualifying for
committeeships [under Article 78] because they may not be said to be
legally insane, but who are unable to manage their own affairs because
of other debilitating factors. Another is to overcome the reluctance of
relatives or other interested persons to apply for the appointment of a
committee upon a judicial finding of incompetence. The appointment
of a conservator to manage a person's property carries with it no
stigma. In most cases, as here, it is purposed to establish a fiduciary to
care for the property of a person who by reason of advancing age
cannot perform this function himself.
Id. at 80.
5 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 78 (McKinney 1988) (repealed 1993).
Article 78 established the procedure for the appointment of a committee, who is
defined as a guardian for an incapacitated person who has been civilly
committed. Id. See also Rose Mary Bailly, Introduction to Article 81 of the
Mental Hygiene Law. Guardianship for Personal Care and/or Property Manage-
ment, in ARTICLE 81 OF THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW 3, 4 (New York State Bar
Ass'n ed., 1993) (defining a committee under Article 78).
6 A "ward" is a person, especially a child or an incompetent individual,
placed by the court under the care and supervision of a guardian or conservator.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1583 (6th ed. 1990).
7 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77 (outlining the procedures for the
appointment of a conservator to safeguard the property of an incapacitated
person); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 78 (detailing the procedures for the
appointment of a committee to protect the welfare of an incapacitated person).
' See Julia C. Spring & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Conservatorship in New
York State: Does it Serve the Needs of the Elderly?, THE RECORD, Apr. 1990,
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ad litem9 often waived the presence of alleged incapacitated adults
even though they were often capable of making their own deci-
sions. Advocates of elder law reform ° vigorously argued that
Articles 77 and 78 must be repealed to remedy the abuses being
suffered by elderly persons under these guardianship statutes."
at 288. This article details the American Bar Association's Committee on Legal
Problems of the Aging's analysis of data from 92 conservator and committee
cases in the Bronx, Brooklyn and Manhattan. Id. The report highlights four
primary deficiencies of the old guardianship system. Id. at 300. First, the process
was very slow. Id. Second, in 90 of the 92 cases the guardian ad litem waived
the presence of the alleged incapacitated person at the hearing. Id. Third, in
appointing conservators, judges did not use specific directives to limit the
conservator's powers. Id. Finally, post-appointment monitoring of conservators
and committees considered only the income and disbursements of the incapacitat-
ed adult. id. The personal welfare of the ward was not monitored. Id.
' A guardian ad litem is a "[p]erson appointed by the court in a proceeding
that is in litigation, to protect the interests in the litigation of an infant,
incompetent, or missing or absent person, or anyone else who is under a
disability, who is a party to, or interested in the litigation." Beane, supra note 1,
at 256.
"o See Bailly, supra note 5, at 4 (describing how advocates of elder law
reform such as the Brookdale Center on Aging, the largest multidisciplinary
gerontology center in New York City, as well as members of the Bar, the
judiciary, and practitioners contributed to the repeal of Articles 77 and 78
through legislative debate).
" See Bailly, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the series of debates that
catalyzed the repeal of Articles 77 and 78); see also In re Appointment of a
Conservator of the Property of Virginia Fisher, 552 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct.
1989). The Fisher case involved a proceeding to appoint a conservator for
Virginia Fisher, an incapacitated 83 year-old woman. Id. at 808. Ms. Fisher
suffered from uterine cancer and was admitted to Lenox Hill Hospital for surgery
and radiation treatment. Id. While recovering from surgery, a petition was
brought by the Department of Social Work (the "Department") at Lenox Hill to
appoint a conservator to manage Ms. Fisher's property and funds. Id. at 809. The
Department also requested that the court issue an order requiring Ms. Fisher to
accept the services of a home attendant or social worker. Id. The court denied
the Department's request on the grounds that the appointment of a conservator
to preserve the property of persons unable to manage their affairs does not
authorize that conservator to make health care and placement decisions that
infringe upon the conservatee's personal liberty. Id. at 810. As a result, the court
held that until Ms. Fisher is adjudicated as incompetent to manage her affairs
under Article 78, she must be permitted to make her own healthcare decisions.
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Catalyzed by these advocates for the elderly, and after four years
of legislative debate, Article 81 was enacted in 1992.12 The focus
of Article 81 was to protect the elderly by establishing the
procedures for the appointment of a guardian13 dedicated to the
diverse and complex needs of incapacitated adults.' 4 The signifi-
cance of this statute has been magnified by New York's growing
elderly population and its need for an effective guardianship
system. 15
Since its enactment, Article 81 has functioned successfully as
a guardianship statute for the elderly'16 However, some courts
have begun to apply Article 81 to guardianship proceedings for mi-
nors. 7 Because Article 81 is an "Adult Guardianship Statute"'18
Id. at 815.
12 See Bailly, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the focus of Article 81's
enactment).
3 A guardian is defined as "[a] person (18 years of age or older) or a
corporation or public agency appointed by the [c]ourt who is lawfully invested
with the power and charged with the duty of taking care of the person and/or
managing the property and affairs of another person who is determined by the
[c]ourt to be incapacitated." See Beane, supra note 1, at 256.
14 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 1997).
"5 See generally Rose Mary Bailly & Robert L. Geltzer, Mental Hygiene
Law - Article 81: A Judicial Deskbook in GUARDIANSHIP LAW: ARTICLE 81 -
1997 TRAINING TO OBTAIN CERTIFICATION, 1997, 35 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. D-258, 1997) (noting that the repeal of
Articles 77 and 78 was necessary in order to establish a guardianship system
under Article 81 to accommodate the needs of New York's elderly population
which "has been increasingly sustained by extraordinary medical technologies").
16 Id.
7 In re Addo, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1997, at 26 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (holding that
an Article 81 proceeding is an appropriate means to appoint a guardian for a
mentally retarded child); In re Lavecchia, 650 N.Y.S.2d 955, 955 (Sup. Ct. 1996)
(converting an Article 81 proceeding to an Article 17 guardianship proceeding
for a physically disabled thirteen year-old); In re Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d 969,
969 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that an Article 81 proceeding is an appropriate
vehicle for safeguarding the assets of seven year-old Adonis Pineda); In re Le,
637 N.Y.S.2d 614, 615 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (determining that an Article 81
proceeding to appoint a guardian for a ten year-old functioning at least one grade
level below normal is appropriate).
"8 See Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 972. Although the Marmol decision was
commenced for an infant, the court noted that Article 81 is an "Adult
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designed for a self-supporting elderly person, 9 commencing
Guardianship Statute" which contemplates a self-supporting adult. Id.
"9 Id. at 972. Under Article 81, "self-supporting adults" have the monetary
and property means to provide for their care, but a guardian is necessary to
manage these funds. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (outlining the powers
to appoint a guardian of the person and property of a self-supporting adult). The
guardian of the property of an incapacitated person must locate, safeguard,
transfer and bring together all of the assets of the incapacitated person upon
being commissioned (by the Clerk of the Court) as guardian of the property. See
Beane, supra note 1, at 251. The guardian must then open separate guardianship
bank and brokerage accounts, located in New York State only, under the ward's
social security number. See Margaret Ann Bomba, Legal Duties and Responsi-
bilities of a Guardian, in GUARDIANSHIP LAW: ARTICLE 81 - 1997 TRAINING TO
OBTAIN CERTIFICATION, 1997, 350 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. D-258, 1997). The guardian then must obtain, save and pay
all bills necessary for the care and maintenance of the ward. Id. at 351. This
system contemplates a self-supporting adult because the funds for the mainte-
nance of the ward derive from the ward's social security benefits, pension
benefits, interest income or principal. Id. The court monitors the guardian's
transactions by having the guardian file an Annual Report by May 31 each year.
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.31. The Annual Report contains a true and
full account of all of the guardian's receipts and disbursements for the calendar
year. See Bomba, supra, at 423-25. The Annual Report contains the following
schedules:
1) Schedule A sets forth the principal account with which the guardian
is charged pursuant to last year's Annual Report as well as any
additional principal which came into the guardian's hands for the
calendar year.
2) Schedule A-1 is a statement of all income which came into the
guardian's possession for the calendar year.
3) Schedule A-2 is a statement of all capital gains which occurred for
the calendar year.
4) Schedule B is a statement of all disbursements made during the
calendar year, including administrative expenses and expenses for the
care and maintenance of the IP [incapacitated person] for the calendar
year.
5) Schedule B-1 is a statement of all capital losses.
6) Schedule C is a statement of all assets remaining on hand as of
December 31 of the calendar year for which the accounting is
prepared.
7) Schedule D is a statement of claims against the estate which are
limited to unpaid administration expenses.
8) Schedule E is a statement of all changes to the principal account.
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guardianship actions for minors under Article 81 has raised
questions about the statute's ability to protect children personally
and financially.
20
This Note argues that by applying Article 81 to guardianship
proceedings for children, some New York courts have misinterpret-
ed both the meaning and intent of the statute. 21 An examination
of cases in which Article 81 was applied to children illustrates that
while the judiciary may desire to protect children, the ultimate
decision of whether minors are covered under Article 81 must
remain with the New York State Legislature.22 Part I of this Note
examines the history of Article 81, and reveals that the statute was
born out of the need to protect elderly persons from being
committed to nursing homes by conservators who only had
authority over their finances. Part II analyzes the plain meaning of
the language of Article 81, while Part III examines the legislative
intent behind the enactment of Article 81. Lastly, Part IV discusses
the four reported cases involving Article 81 proceedings for minors,
giving particular emphasis to In re Addo.23 This Note concludes
that in light of the problems with applying Article 81 to minors, the
statute should be amended to include infants, or in the alternative,
the entire guardianship process should be reformed to address the
specific needs of minors through the implementation of mediation.
See Bomba, supra, at 423-24. The Annual Report is reviewed by the court, as
well as a court evaluator. See Bomba, supra, at 423-24. A court evaluator is a
"person appointed by the [c]ourt whose role in the Guardianship proceeding is
to investigate" the accuracy and veracity of the Annual Report. See Beane, supra
note 1, at 252.
20 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (McKinney 1997) (describing the
concerns raised in the legal community regarding whether Article 81 should be
employed for an infant when well-developed case law and rules exist under
C.P.L.R. 12).
21 See discussion infra Part II.
22 See infra Part V.
23 In re Addo, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1997, at 26 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
NEW YORK GUARDIANSHIP LAW
I. THE HISTORY OF ARTICLE 81
Article 81 was enacted in July 1992 and became effective on
April 1, 1993.24 Article 81 repealed the former guardianship
statutes, Articles 7725 and 78,26 by creating a procedure for the
appointment of a guardian whose powers are tailored to the
"personal wishes, preferences, and desires" 7 of an elderly
incapacitated person.28
Article 81 repealed Articles 77 and 78, after a study by New
York's Law Revision Commission 29 ("Commission") determined
that Articles 77 and 78 did not provide elderly incapacitated
persons with adequate protection.3 ° In addition, the Commission
24 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (outlining the legislative history of
Article 81).
25 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77 (McKinney 1988). Article 77 outlined
the procedures for the appointment of a guardian of the property of an
incapacitated person. Id. Under Article 81, a guardian of the property is
described as one who is appointed by the court with authority to manage the
property and financial affairs of the incapacitated person. See N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 81.21.
26 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 78 (McKinney 1988). Article 78 outlined
the procedures for the appointment of a committee of an elderly incapacitated
person. Id. Under Article 81, a committee is now defined as a "guardian of the
person" who is appointed by the court to provide for the personal needs of the
incapacitated person. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22 (McKinmey 1997).
27 Id. § 81.01.
21 See id. § 81 (establishing a guardianship system to meld, when appropri-
ate, into one person, to wit, the guardian, all powers formerly divided between
the conservator under Article 77 and the committee under Article 78). See also
Julie M. Solinski, Guardianship Proceedings in New York: Proposals for Article
81 to Address Both the Lack of Funding and Resource Problems, 17 PACE L.
REV. 445, 447-49 (1997) (stating that Article 81 replaced Articles 77 and 78
because of the inflexibility of the dual structure of the conservatorship and
committee system in addressing the needs of persons with incapacities).
29 Established in 1934, the New York State Law Revision Commission is the
oldest agency in the common-law system devoted to law reform through
legislation. Bailly, supra note 5, at 19.
30 The Law Revision Commission determined that:
[T]here is a consensus among the members of the Judiciary, the Bar,
and representatives of state, local and private agencies who work with
309
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found that Article 77 was inadequate because it primarily regulated
the conservator's control over the money and property of an elderly
incapacitated person.31 The personal needs of an elderly incapaci-
tated person were not addressed under this article.32
Alternatively, Article 78 authorized the appointment of a
committee that could exercise total personal control over an elderly
incapacitated person, provided a court found the person totally
incompetent.33 However, "[a] finding of incompetence was a
drastic measure, which could deprive individuals of their civil
rights., 34 Consequently, courts were reluctant to employ Article
78 to appoint a committee for an elderly incapacitated person.35
Instead, courts favored Article 77 because it provided a less drastic
disabled older adults that the most helpful method of relieving this
problem would be the creation of a single statute with a standard for
appointment which focuses on the needs of the individual and permits
the appointment of a guardian who can make decisions regarding either
the person or the property of the person, or both if appropriate.
Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law: Hearings on S.4498C Before the
Committee on Mental Hygiene (1992) (memorandum of the Law Revision
Commission) (emphasis added); see also EDWIN KASOFF ET AL., ELDERLAW AND
GUARDIANSHIP IN NEW YORK § 11:2, at 463 (1st ed. 1996) (describing the
inadequacies of Articles 77 and 78); Bailly, supra note 5, at 3-4.
The Law Revision Commission's initial concern in its proceedings to repeal
Article 77 was that its standard of substantial impairment, which related only to
incapacitated persons' ability to manage their property, was improperly being
used to allow a conservator power over the incapacitated persons. Bailly, supra
note 5, at 3-4. Moreover, the Law Revision Commission also recommended
proposals for the reform of Article 78, which had fallen into disuse because it
required the court to find that the alleged incapacitated person was completely
incompetent. Bailly, supra note 5, at 4. The courts were reluctant to make such
a finding because it frequently translated into "an accompanying stigma and a
loss of civil rights." Bailly, supra note 5, at 4.
31 See KASOFF, supra note 30, § 11:3, at 463.
32 See KASOFF, supra note 30, § 11:3, at 463.
33 See KASOFF, supra note 30, § 11:4, at 463.
34 See KASOFF, supra note 30, § 11:4, at 463.
35 See KASOFF, supra note 30, § 11:4, at 463. "Article 78 went beyond
financial matters, authorizing the appointment of a committee that could exercise
control over the personal life of a person judged to be incompetent." KASOFF,
supra note 30, § 11:4, at 463.
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measure." However, as noted, Article 77 was ill-equipped to deal
with the personal welfare of the elderly.
37
In order to remedy the inadequacies of Articles 77 and 78, New
York courts began giving conservators greater authority over their
conservatee's personal welfare under Article 77.38 In re Cook39
and In re Huffard4° are noteworthy examples of courts' expan-
sions of conservators' Article 77 powers into the realm of the
committee.
The Cook decision involved an Article 77 proceeding in which
an almost ninety year-old woman, Alice Schildmacher, contracted
to sell land to LeFini Homes for $75,000.41 Schildmacher's
attorney, John Cook, drafted the contract,42 and approximately five
months later was appointed conservator of the property of
Schildmacher. Shortly before the closing date, a title search
revealed that Schildmacher did not have clear title to the premis-
es.43 Nearly two years after the discovery of the title defect, the
conservator commenced a proceeding to clear title.' The court
found for the conservator and declined to approve the contract of
sale on the ground that the conservatee lacked the mental capacity
to execute a contract.45 The court held that Schildmacher lacked
capacity despite never being declared incompetent under Article
78.46 Although the court recognized that Schildmacher was never
36 See KASOFF, supra note 30, § 11:4, at 463. "For many individuals, a
committee was an excessive and unnecessary remedy. Because Article 78
frequently presented 'all-or-nothing' choices, the courts were reluctant to use it.
Instead, attempts were made to expand the limits of Article 77." KASOFF, supra
note 30, § 11:4, at 463.
37 See KASOFF, supra note 30, § 11:4, at 463.
'8 See, e.g., In re Cook, 520 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 (App. Div. 1987) (expanding
conservator's powers by allowing an Article 77 conservator to nullify a contract
made by a competent conservatee); In re Huffard, 381 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (Sup.
Ct. 1976) (stating that the court may expand a conservator's powers).
'9 520 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01.
40 381 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
4' Cook, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01.
42 Id. at 401.
43 Id.
44 Id.
4S Id. at 402.
46 id.
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adjudicated incompetent, it held that the manner in which her
attorney/conservator discharged his duties was not in the best
interests of his ward.47 The Cook decision thereby opened the door
for conservators to expand their powers based on a "best interest of
the ward" standard.
The second case of note is In re Huffard.48 In Huffard, the
court declined to appoint a bank as conservator of the property of
an elderly person. 49 However, the court stated that it was within
its powers to appoint an institution as conservator of an elderly
incapacitated person. 50 The court substantiated its reasoning by
finding that "[t]he powers and duties of the conservators are set
forth in the amended law [N.Y Mental Hygiene Law § 77.19(3)],
which casts an additional duty on the court. However, the court
may add . . .any of the aforesaid powers during the term of the
conservatorship." 5
The practices typified in Cook and Huffard were eventually
overruled by the New York Court of Appeals' ruling in In re
Grinker.52 The Grinker court held that Article 77 did not empower
a conservator to commit an elderly incapacitated person to a
nursing home. 53 The court stated that "[t]he availability of such a
47 Id.
4" 381 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
49 Id. at 197.
50 Id.
51 Id.
12 573 N.E.2d 536 (N.Y. 1991). The Grinker case was the impetus for the
repealing of Articles 77 and 78. See KASOFF, supra note 30, § 11:5, at 463-64.
Grinker highlighted the fact that Articles 77 and 78 did not afford sufficient due
process protection to allegedly incapacitated adults. See KASOFF, supra note 30,
§ 11:5, at 463-64. The Grinker court resolved a long-standing split of opinions
among judges and practitioners by ruling that a conservator or guardian of the
property under Article 77 could not authorize a nursing home placement. See
KASOFF, supra note 30, § 11:5, at 463-64. Specifically, the court held that
Article 77 did not give a conservator the power to commit the conservatee to a
nursing home. Grinker, 573 N.E.2d at 540. Therefore, the birth of Article 81
resulted from an issue specifically tailored to an elderly person: who has the
authority to place an elderly person in a nursing home? See Bailly, supra note
5, at 10-11 (describing how the New York Court of Appeals' ruling in Grinker
catalyzed the repeal of Articles 77 and 78).
5' Grinker, 573 N.E.2d at 537.
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significant involuntary displacement of personal liberty should be
confined to a Mental Hygiene Law [A]rticle 78 incompetency
proceeding, with its full panoply of procedural due process
safeguards."54 In short, New York State's highest court limited the
broad application of Article 77 by ruling that conservators do not
have the authority to make decisions regarding the person of the
conservatee.55 The Grinker decision drew a bright line between
the powers of a conservator and a committee. 6 The Court of
Appeals, however, left open the question of how courts should
provide for elderly persons requiring more than the limited services
of mere conservators, but less than the complete control of
committees.57 The Legislature answered this question by enacting
Article 81, which established the procedure for the appointment of
a guardian whose powers are tailored to both the personal and
property management needs of elderly incapacitated persons.58
54 Id. at 539.
'5 Id. (explaining that the intent of the legislature in enacting Article 77 was
to limit the scope of a conservator's power only to the conservatee's property,
not the conservatee's person).
56 KASOFF, supra note 30, § 11:5, at 463-64 (stating that the Grinker
decision clarified the distinction between a conservator and a committee).
57 KASOFF, supra note 30, § 11:5, at 463-64.
58 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (McKinney 1997). Under section
81.02(a), "[t]he court may appoint a guardian for the person if the court
determines: (1) that the appointment is necessary to provide for the personal
needs of that person, including food, clothing, shelter, health care, or safety
and/or to manage the property and financial affairs of that person." Id. Section
81.02 does not expressly state that only elderly persons are covered under the
statute. However, the legislature never intended Article 81 to apply to children.
See infra Part III (discussing the legislative intent underlying the passage of
Article 81); see also In re Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (Sup. Ct. 1996)
(noting in dictum that while no express language in Article 81 states that a
guardianship proceeding cannot commence for a minor, the statute was intended
to apply to adult incapacitated persons only). In Marmol, the mother of Adonis,
a child who had been incapacitated by an automobile accident, filed a petition
for appointment of guardian of person and property of her child under Article 81.
The court appointed the attorney, Rebecca Rawson, guardian of the property of
Adonis Pineda and Allison Marmol as guardian of his person. See infra Part
IV.B, discussing Marmol.
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II. THE PLAIN MEANING OF ARTICLE 81
The express language of Article 81 makes clear that it does not
apply to infants.59 First, the language of Article 81 demonstrates
that the statute is designed solely for the protection of judicially
declared incapacitated adults.60 Article 81 outlines the powers of
guardians, as fiduciaries, to maintain the property and person of
incapacitated adults. 6' Because the powers are designed to deal
with specific problems confronting the elderly, the statute would be
rendered absurd if applied to minors. 62 For example, sections of
Article 81, such as the "adult care facility"63 and the "multipur-
pose senior citizen center[] ' '64 provisions, are concepts which are
inapplicable to children. 65 The language of Article 81 also delin-
eates the powers of guardians to "provide support for persons
dependent upon the incapacitated person for support, whether or not
the incapacitated person is legally obligated to provide for that
support., 66 In addition, the text of Article 81 outlines the proce-
dure for guardians to "exercise rights to elect options and change
" See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that
numerous sections within the text of Article 81 detail circumstances, such as how
a guardian should modify an incapacitated person's will, which if applied to
minors would render portions of the text of Article 81 absurd).
60 See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
61 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (outlining the powers of a
guardian).
62 Sections of Article 81 would be rendered absurd if applied to children
because they outline guidelines which a guardian must follow when an
incapacitatedperson is married, has a deceased spouse, is a tenant in the entirety
or is an alcoholic. See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.
63 An adult care facility is a family type home for adults, or a shelter or
residence for adults. It provides temporary or long-term residential care and
services to adults who do not require continual medical or nursing care, but are
unable to live independently because of physical or other limitations associated
with age. See Beane, supra note 1, at 248; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 81.03(e) (defining adult care homes and facilities); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 2
(McKinney 1997) (defining "adult care facility").
64 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03(e).
65 id.
66 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(a)(2) (McKinney 1997).
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beneficiaries under insurance and annuity policies and to surrender
the policies for their cash value., 67 Finally, Article 81 also states
that guardians have the power to "exercise any rights to an elective
share in the estate of the incapacitated person's deceased
spouse., 68 The plain meaning of these provisions, when read in
the context of the entire statute, prove that the Legislature intended
Article 81 to apply only to elderly incapacitated persons.
Second, the actual words of Article 81 reveal that the Legisla-
ture intended the statute to apply only to the elderly. The canons of
statutory interpretation hold that to interpret a statute correctly,
primary analysis may begin and end with its precise language.69
Therefore, it is not necessary to look beyond the words to ascertain
the legislature's intent.70 For example, in addressing due process
67 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(a)(8).
6" N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(a)(9).
69 See N.Y. STATUTES § 230-40 (McKinney 1997). The New York Courts
that have applied Article 81 for minors utilize the canon of statutory construction
which states that "[w]ords of ordinary import used in a statute are to be given
their usual and commonly understood meaning." Id. § 232. In this manner the
courts hold that the terms "person" and "individual" within the text of Article 81
should be given a general or plain meaning in order to allow the statute to
encompass children. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01. For example, the
"Legislative Findings and Purposes" section of Article 81 states that guardianship
proceedings should be commenced pursuant to "the needs of persons with
incapacities." Id. (emphasis added). The statute never expressly states that
children are excluded from the definition of person. Id. The only time that the
statute makes reference to age is when it defines the term "guardian." Id.
§ 81.03(a). The statute states that "'guardian' means a person who is eighteen
years of age or older." Id. The statute's definition of guardian, however, suggests
that a person is also one who is eighteen or older, i.e. not a minor. Id.
Nonetheless, even if the court were to employ the canon of statutory interpreta-
tion holding that plain language must be given effect, it would violate the
opposing canon which states that general meaning does not apply "[w]hen the use
of certain words in a statute is inconsistent... or makes the clause meaningless
or absurd." N.Y. STATUTES § 231. Because the powers granted to guardians of
the person and property do not apply to children, inclusion of such a group under
Article 81 would render these powers absurd.
70 The canons of statutory interpretation in New York state that: "[i]n the
construction of statutes . . . . [T]he words used should be given the meaning
intended by the lawmakers, and words will not be expanded so as to enlarge their
meaning to something the Legislature could easily have expressed but did not."
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issues in its "Legislative Findings and Purposes" section, Article
81's text clearly states: "[i]mperfect as the guardianship system
may be in this regard, at least there is a mechanism for questioning
decisions regarding an impaired older adult."7 Consequently,
New York Courts must not expand Article 81 to include infants
because under New York's rules for statutory interpretation, the
courts must not do that which the Legislature could have easily
done: include infants under the umbrella of Article 81.
III. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The "Legislative Findings and Purposes''72 section of Article
81 also indicates that the statute was enacted to address the
"[n]eeds of persons with incapacities [which] are as diverse and
complex as they are unique to the individual. '73 To effectuate this
goal, Article 81 establishes the procedure for the appointment of a
guardian whose powers are narrowly tailored to meet the needs of
elderly incapacitated adults.74 In order to create a narrowly
tailored guardianship, the statute expressly provides that an elderly
incapacitated person should be granted "the greatest amount of
independence and self-determination and participation in all the
decisions affecting such person's life., 75 In its debates, the
N.Y. STATUTES § 230.
71 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (emphasis added).
72 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 1997).
73 Id. See also Bailly, supra note 5, at 3 (outlining the findings of the
Commission with respect to the needs of the elderly).
74 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(a)(2) (McKinney 1997) (stating that
"[a]ny guardian appointed under this article shall be granted only those powers
which are necessary ... in such a manner as appropriate to the individual and
which shall constitute the least restrictive form of intervention"). See, e.g., In re
Early, N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1993, at 22 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (dismissing hospital's
petition for appointment of a guardian for an eighty year-old blind woman
because she had a plan for the management of her own affairs that was narrowly
tailored to her needs). The Early court declined to appoint a guardian to manage
Ms. Early's funds because she had made suitable arrangements with a trustworthy
neighbor to accommodate her financial needs. Id.
71 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01. See also Early, N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1993,
at 22 (determining that an elderly person can make decisions about the plan of
care he or she desires).
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Commission studied reports from specialists in geriatric medicine
to determine how Article 81 might provide older adults with greater
freedom and self determination.76 Because the Legislature never
intended infant guardianship proceedings to be commenced under
Article 81, the needs of children were not addressed in these
legislative debates and studies.77 Consequently, Article 81 is ill-
equipped to deal with infant guardianship issues and an Article 81
guardianship proceeding should never be commenced for an infant.
Moreover, the Governor's Bill Jacket78 contains transcripts of
both New York State Senate and Assembly debates, committee
reports and correspondence that affirmatively state that the
Legislature never intended Article 81 to apply to minors v.7  For
76 See Law Revision Commission Comments to N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 81.02 (McKinney 1997). The Commission's comments indicate that during the
legislative debates over the amendment of Article 81, specialists in geriatric
medicine conducted functional evaluations of elderly persons' basic needs and
recommended how new legislation should be designed to meet these needs. The
evaluations provided information about elderly persons' physical ability, sensory
functioning and spending patterns in order for the court to craft a narrowly
tailored Article 81 guardianship order. Id.
I d. (making no comment about including minors).
7 See Governor's Bill Jacket to 1992 N.Y. Laws 698. The Governor's Bill
Jacket is the primary collection.of legislative history in New York State. See
Robert M. Zinman, Under the Spreading Bankruptcy: Subordinations and the
Codes, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 293, 315 n.122 (1994) (describing the
purposes of the Bill Jacket in New York State legislative history). It is comprised
of letters and reports received by the Governor or the Governor's counsel
interpreting a bill that has passed. Id. The letters, reports, and memoranda
recommend that the Governor either pass the legislation, veto the legislation, or
make no comment on the legislation. Id. The Bill Jacket is available to the public
at the New York State Library in Albany and from the New York State
Legislative Service, Inc. located at 299 Broadway, New York, New York 10007.
Id.
'9 See Governor's Bill Jacket to 1992 N.Y. Laws 698. The Bill Jacket
contains memoranda written to Elizabeth D. Moore, Counsel to Governor, in
reference to "an act amending the Mental Hygiene Law, relating to the
appointment of guardians for personal needs and property management for
persons who are likely to suffer harm because they cannot provide for their own
food or shelter." See id. The Bill Jacket also contains the Report of the Law
Revision Commission, Assembly debates and Senate debates. The Law Revision
Commission's members dedicated to the enactment of Article 81 were Carolyn
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example, the Acting Executive Director of the Council on Children
and Families abstained from commenting on the implications of
Article 81 in a letter of reply to the Counsel to the Governor 8°
because Article 81 was not presented as a statute involving the
rights and regulation of minors.8
Additionally, on March 17, 1992, Julia C. Spring, Esq. of The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York presented
testimony for the Joint Public Hearings regarding proceedings for
Gentile, Christopher J. Mega, Dale M. Volker and Joseph R. Lentol. The
sponsors of this legislation in the Senate were Nicholas Spano, Chair, Senate
Mental Hygiene, and in the Assembly, G. Oliver Koppell, Chair, Assembly
Judiciary, and Elizabeth Connelly, former chair, Assembly Mental Health. Id. See
also infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (highlighting the fact that
correspondences to the Governor's Law Revision Commission from agencies
such as the Council on Children and Families indicate that the Legislature never
intended Article 81 to apply to children).
'o Letter from Frederick B. Meservey, Acting Executive Director of New
York's Council on Children and Families, to Elizabeth D. Moore, Counsel to the
Governor, State of N.Y. (July 21, 1992), Governor's Bill Jacket to 1992 N.Y.
Laws 698. Mr. Meservey wrote:
The Council assumes that the new Article [81] relates primarily to
incapacitatedadults since it does not repeal or amend Surrogate's Court
Procedure Act Article 17 (Guardians and Custodians [for infants] or
17-A (Guardians of Mentally Retarded and Developmentally Disabled
Persons) or the Family Court Act or Social Services Law provisions
relating to guardianship and custody, or care and custody, of children.
... Based on that assumption, the Council on Children and Families
makes no recommendation with respect to the bill, since it does not
directly affect areas of interest in which the council is currently
involved.
Id. Additionally, Mr. Meservey concludedhis correspondence by stating that "the
Bill has no impact on families." Id.
"' Id. This correspondence by the Council on Children and Families is very
troublesome because it brings to the forefront the misunderstanding regarding
Article 81. The Council never expected Article 81 to apply to children. Id.
Consequently, the Council read the proposed law and interpreted it to have no
impact on families. Id. The Council is a safeguard for the protection of children
and families and would have proposed Guardianship Training for Children and
educational requirements for infant incapacitated persons had it anticipated that
Article 81 would apply to children. Id. See also infra Part V, discussing
recommendations the Legislature must follow should the New York Courts
continue their trend in judicial activism by applying Article 81 for minors.
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the appointment of a guardian under Article 81 .82 Ms. Spring
stated: "The Association of the Bar of the City of New York
strongly supports the passage of proposed Article 81 to the Mental
Hygiene Law as an act to meet the needs, while preserving the
liberties, of adults who are judicially determined to be incapacitat-
ed.",83 The express language of the testimony of the Bar states that
"adults" are to be protected.84 Again, no language in the testimony
extends to children.85 In further support of the proposition that
Article 81 does not apply to minors, Spring stated, "[p]roposed
Article 81 is designed to key order to need. It thus generates the
least restrictive intervention possible to compensate for the
incapacitated adult's deficiencies. "86
Finally, Legislative Document (1991) No. 65 by the State of
New York, Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1991,
stated: "The focus of the Commission's study has been to define
the decisionmaking [sic] needs of disabled older adults, to examine
the current statutory procedures and local practices in light of such
needs, and to recommend proposals for change where appropri-
ate.",87 In order to accomplish this goal, the Commission circulated
questionnaires to public and private agencies involved in addressing
the needs of disabled older adults.88 Again, the focus of the
questionnaire was on the needs of elderly persons. The question-
naire made no mention of children. 89 Therefore, because the
Legislature and the legislative debates never expressed an intent to
82 Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law: Joint Public Hearings by the
Committee on Legal Problems of the Aging Legal Problems of the Mentally IIl
and Medicine and Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Governor's Bill Jacket to 1992 N.Y. Law 698.





88 Id. The study disregarded data collected from wards less than fifty years
of age. The study concluded that one statute-an Adult Guardian statute-must
replace Articles 77 and 78 because there was no oversight of obligations
regarding the personal welfare of incapacitated older adults. Id.
89 Id.
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apply Article 81 to minors, the statute should not be used in a
guardianship proceeding for a minor.
In contrast to Article 81, Article 17 of New York Surrogate's
Court Procedure Act9° ("Article 17") and Article 12 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules9 ("C.PL.R. 12") were
expressly designed to protect children. The intent of Article 17 and
C.P.L.R. 12 derives from the Surrogate's Courts' wide discretion
in protecting infants under its best interests of the child standard.92
As a result, both Article 17 and C.PL.R. 12 outline strict criteria
that proposed guardians must meet in order to be granted guardian-
ship powers.93 For example, proposed Article 17 guardians must
affirmatively state in their petition "the reasons why [they] would
be a suitable guardian." 94 The Article 17 petition must also
disclose whether the proposed guardian has been the subject of a
child abuse report. 95 In addition, the petition must include an
accounting of the child's assets and income.96 C.P.L.R. 12 con-
tains similar criteria for the selection of a guardian. Under this
statute, "[i]n the selection of a guardian the court will be guided by
the moral character and future ability of the [proposed guardian] to
advance and promote the interests of the infant." 97 Therefore,
guardianship proceedings for minors should only be commenced
under Article 17 or C.PL.R. 12.
90 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 17 (McKinney 1997).
9' N.Y. C.P.L.R. 12 (McKinney 1997).
92 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1707 (McKinney 1997) (stating that "[i]f
the court be satisfied that the interests of the infant will be promoted by the
appointment of a guardian of his person or of his property, or both, it must make
a decree accordingly"); see also KASOFF, supra note 30, § 10:9, at 439.
93 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1704 (outlining contents of an Article 17
petition).
94 Id. § 1704(7).
9' Id. § 1704(6).
96 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1704(4) (stating that a petition for the
appointment of a guardian for an infant must include "[t]he estimated value of
the real and personal property and of the annual income therefrom to which the
infant is entitled").
9' N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1210 note (McKinney 1997) (Legislative Studies and
Reports).
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Nothing in the legislative history, nor in the background of its
enactment, indicates that Article 81 was intended as a guardianship
statute for infants. Because the Legislature never intended Article
81 to apply to minors, an overwhelming majority of cases reported
under Article 81 involve the elderly.98 Nonetheless, in some
circumstances, guardianship proceedings for minors have been
brought under Article 81.
IV CASE LAW
An analysis of recent decisions applying Article 81 highlights
the dangers inherent in commencing guardianship proceedings for
infants. 99 In re Le,100 In re Marmol, °1 In re Lavecchia,1 °2
and In re Addo °3 are examples of such cases. The Le decision
was the first to use Article 81 in an infant guardianship proceed-
ing.104 The Le opinion held that the application of Article 81 to
an infant was appropriate because the statute's underlying purpose
was to create a guardianship tailored to the needs of an incapacitat-
ed person.105 The second case to employ Article 81 for an infant
" See, e.g., In re Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (Sup. Ct. 1996)
(discussing the fact that Article 81 is overwhelmingly a guardianship law for the
elderly).
'9 The third case, In re Lavecchia, was initially commenced as an Article 81
guardianship proceeding, but was later converted to a proceeding under S.C.P.A.
17. 650 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
00 637 N.Y.S.2d 614 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
'0' 640 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
102 650 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
103 In re Addo, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1997, at 26 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
104 Le, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 614. The Le case involved a guardianship proceeding
brought under Article 81 for a ten year-old boy who suffered severe injuries after
falling four stories from his apartment window. Id. Although the child was
seriously injured, he was only one year below his normal grade level as a result
of the accident. Id. at 614-15. This important fact shows that the child had a fair
opportunity to become a competent adult. Id. Consequently, the court should
never have commenced a proceeding under Article 81.
'05 Id. at 617 (arguing that the application of Article 81 to infants is
appropriate because the needs of minors are more unique than those of adults);
see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 1997) (mandating that the
"needs of persons with incapacities are as diverse and complex as they are unique
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was In re Marmol, which advocated the broadest interpretation of
Article 81 in proceedings for the appointment of a guardian of the
person and property of an infant. 10 6 The third case of signifi-
cance, In re Lavecchia,10 7 involved a proceeding originally
brought under Article 81 to appoint a guardian for a thirteen year-
old, but later was converted to a proceeding under Article 17.' °'
The Lavecchia court recognized the inappropriateness of applying
Article 81, a statute designed to meet the needs of the elderly, to
minors. In the final case dealing with minors, In re Addo,10 9 the
court recognized the rarity of applying Article 81 to infant
proceedings, yet did not employ other available statutory reme-
dies."' ° Collectively, these four cases highlight the difficulty of
to the individual").
.06 See Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 972 (stating that "[a] guardian may be
appointed for anyone, of whatever age, who is functionally disabled to make a
decision affecting his or her life"); see also Cerisse Anderson, Use of Guardian
Law for Child is Allowed; Support by Parents is Still Required, N.Y.L.J., Feb.
23, 1996, at 1 (noting that Marmol is the first major case applying Article 81 to
an infant).
'07 650 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (involving a thirteen year-old
quadriplegic for whom a guardianship proceeding under Article 81 was
commenced). The proceeding was brought despite the fact that the infant was
"alert, knowledgeable, articulate and [understood] the nature of [the] proceeding."
Id. at 956. In this case, the court converted the Article 81 proceeding into a
proceeding under S.C.P.A. Article 17. Id. at 957. The court ruled that an Article
17 proceeding was the appropriate remedy because it provided specific and well-
established procedural mechanisms to protect infants, the mentally retarded and
persons who were developmentally disabled. Id. Kasoff, supra note 30, § 10:1,
at 437 ("The focus of Article 17 is protection for persons under eighteen.")
"' See discussion infra Part IV.C and accompanying text.
'09 Addo, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1997 at 26 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (holding that an
Article 81 proceeding is an appropriate means to appoint a guardian for a
mentally retarded child).
... Id. The Addo court noted that while "nothing in [Article 81] precludes
its use for the young, the statute is silent with respect to the parental obligations
and responsibilities of the parents to support the incapacitated child." Id. (citing
Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 969). Although the Addo court recognized this
deficiency in Article 81, it failed to apply the remedy available under C.P.L.R.
12, which governs the application of withdrawals of infant funds. Id. The Addo
court would only state that the case warranted review under N.Y. C.P.L.R.
Article 12. Id.
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safeguarding an infant's funds under a statute crafted for a self-
supporting elderly person.
A. An Analysis of In re Le
The Le court was the first to commence an Article 81 proceed-
ing for a minor. The case involved a guardianship proceeding for
a ten year-old boy named Daniel Le."' Daniel suffered severe
injuries after falling from a fourth floor window of his Queens
apartment." 2 Despite the seriousness of Daniel's injuries, by the
time of the guardianship proceeding, he was no longer under the
regular care of doctors." 3 In fact, Daniel "made a remarkable
recovery" and was only functioning one year below his normal
grade level. "14
The Le court approved a guardianship proceeding to appoint
Kate Le and Stanley Young as co-guardians of the property of
Daniel Le." 5 The court's reasoning for employing Article 81,
where no precedent existed for such application, was absent from
the opinion. In addition, the traditional reasoning that the "Adult
Guardian Statute" should be employed when the infant will never
attain competency upon reaching majority was absent from the Le
. In re Le, 637 N.Y.S.2d 614 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
112 Id. Daniel was placed in foster care shortly after his birth. Id. After foster
care failed, he was placed with his grandmother in her Queens apartment where
six months later he fell four stories from their apartment window. Id.
'3 Id. As a result of injuries he sustained from the fall, Daniel underwent
brain surgery on April 20, 1989 and an operation to repair a perforated ear drum
on July 2, 1991. Id. The guardianship proceeding was commenced on or about
December 11, 1995. Id.
114 Id.
115 Co-guardians are two (or more) persons appointed by the court to act
together as guardians for the incapacitated person. Beane, supra note 1, at 251.
The guardians must act together in all aspects of the guardianship. Beane, supra
note 1, at 251. For example, all checks must be signed by each guardian. Beane,
supra note 1, at 251. Nhan Thi Thanh (Kate) Le is Daniel's adopted sister and
Stanley Young was Daniel's attorney. In re Le, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 615. Daniel's
father, Vincent Le, also commenced an action against Michael Pistilli and the
Pistilli Realty Company, the owners and landlords of the Queens apartment
where Daniel fell. Id. at 614. Prior to the trial a settlement was reached awarding
Daniel $5,326,347 over his lifetime. Id. at 616.
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reasoning. In fact, the Le court could not employ this reasoning
because medical testimony described Daniel as a "fun-loving active
youngster who participates in all types of activities."'' 6 It is
therefore unclear why Article 81 was employed to appoint a
guardian for Daniel.
The Le court attempted to rectify this ambiguity by reasoning
that the intent of Article 81 was to "create a guardianship system
that is tailored to meet the specific needs of the individual by
taking into account the personal wishes, preferences and desires of
the alleged incapacitated person."' l 7 Upon this rationale, the Le
court attempted to expand the language of Article 81 to encompass
all individuals, including infants. The court stated that "[a]s a result
of Daniel's youth and inexperience, he [was] unable to prepare his
own meals, attend to his own purchases, provide for his education,
and use public transportation for himself.""' In light of the fact
that most ten year-old children are unable to perform the aforemen-
tioned tasks, it is not clear why the court appointed a guardian for
a youngster only functioning at one grade below normal." 9 The
Le court's decision raised numerous questions regarding the
appropriateness of employing Article 81 to infants. The court's
reasoning apparently hinged on the statute's language that the
"needs of persons with incapacities are as diverse and complex as
they are unique to the individual."'20 Therefore, the Le court
suggests that the protection of Daniel's settlement was a priority,
and thus, Article 81 should be employed. This reasoning is flawed
because it does not explain the court's logic in employing Article
81, a statute written specifically for elderly adults, not for children.
B. An Analysis of In re Marmol
The Marmol ruling is the most prominent case advocating
Article 81 in an infant guardianship proceeding.' 2' This landmark
116 Id. at 615.
117 Id. (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 1997)).
... Id. at 617.
"9 Id. at 614.
120 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01.
121 In re Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
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decision in New York Guardianship Law involved a petition
pursuant to Article 81 for the appointment of a guardian of the
person and property of Adonis Pineda, an infant.122 Adonis
required a guardian to safeguard the approximately $5,400,000
settlement he received from the City of New York after being
struck by a police car.1 3 At the time of the accident Adonis was
just two months shy of his first birthday. 2 4 The accident left
Adonis "mentally retarded, probably for life.
125
Because Adonis was rendered profoundly brain-damaged, the
court employed Article 81 to appoint Allison Marmol as guardian
for her son. 126 Although the funds Adonis received from his
settlement were originally awarded pursuant to C.P.L.R. 12,127 the
court reasoned that an Article 81 proceeding with Adonis' mother
as guardian was more appropriate. 28
The Marmol decision was based primarily on the fact that
Adonis could never reach competency upon attaining majority.
1 29
However, the court's decision to employ Article 81 was inappropri-
ate because an infant's funds are sufficiently safeguarded under
C.P.L.R. 12 past majority.' Nevertheless, the court employed
Article 81, an adult guardianship law whose provisions contemplate
122 Id. at 970.
123 Id. at 971.
124 Id.
125 Id. The guardian in the Marmol case, Rebecca H. Rawson, Esq., wrote
an article in the New York Law Journal in which she disputed the court's
characterizationof Adonis as mentally retarded. See Rebecca H. Rawson, Pay for
Guardians, N.Y.L.J., June 16, 1997, at 2. Ms. Rawson stated, "If you were to
meet [Adonis], you would know immediately that, whatever he may now score
on a standardized test, he is brain-damaged, not mentally retarded." Id.
126 Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
127 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 12 (McKinney 1997). C.P.L.R. 12 sets forth the rules
applicable to all judicial proceedings in which persons under a disability are
parties. Id. Specifically, C.P.L.R. 12 establishes the procedures by which infants,
incompetents, conservatees and other persons with legal disabilities may
prosecute and defend their rights in actions brought by and against them. See,
e.g., DeSantis v. Bruen, 627 N.Y.S.2d 534, 537 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (describing a
proceeding for a child under C.P.L.R. 12).
128 Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
129 Id.
13o See generally infra notes 148-151.
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the incapacitated person to be self-supporting. 31  This action
creates the danger that Adonis must be self-supporting.
1 32
Since Marmol, New York Guardianship practice has been
wrought with questions over whether an Article 81 proceeding is
appropriate for a child. 133 The core question that the Marmol
decision raised was whether the distinction between the law as set
forth in C.PL.R. 12 and Article 81 affects the responsibility of
Adonis' parents to provide for his support. This is a pivotal
question because the law under Article 81 is clear in stating that
incapacitated persons must provide for their own care. This implies
that Adonis must deplete the funds he received from his settlement
to provide for his care. However, under C.PL.R. 12, Adonis' funds
would be held by the court until majority is reached and his parents
would then have the duty to support their incapacitated son. It is
unclear which standard applies under Article 81 guardianships for
infants. However, it is inappropriate for the courts to commence a
proceeding for a child under Article 81 and then act as a quasi-
legislature by amending Article 81 to allow it to conform to
C.PL.R. 12.
The facts of Marmol indicate that an Article 81 guardianship
for a child is not appropriate. Accordingly, the court should never
have transferred the guardianship for Adonis from C.P.L.R. 12 to
Article 81. Although the Marmol court failed to employ C.P.L.R.
12, it did acknowledge that it was defying decades of precedent
standing for the proposition that an infant's funds are securely held
under C.P.L.R. 12.134 The court stated that "[C.P.L.R.] 12 is
generally used to hold the proceeds of an infant's personal injury
settlement until he reaches his majority. ,13' Although the court
recognized that C.PL.R. 12 may be used, it determined that Article
131 Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
132 Id.
133 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (McKinney 1997) (discussing the
questions that the Marmol and Le cases raised regarding whether Article 81 could
be used for an infant, and whether "given statutory and court restrictions on
withdrawal from an infant's funds, an Article 81 guardian could use the monies
received as a result of the settlement to provide for the child's support").
134 Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
135 Id.
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81 was a more efficient remedy because the infant in this case
would never become a competent adult.'36 The Court stated, "to
insure maximum protection," the incapacitated infant's funds would
be held under Article 81.137 In fact, Article 81 enables guardians
to utilize the incapacitated persons' funds with greater discretion
than a remedy under C.RL.R. 12. In general, this is detrimental to
infants because they have a longer life span than the elderly
persons whom Article 81 was meant to reach. The court should
have kept Adonis' funds secure under C.P.L.R. 12 to conserve
them for his later life.
In support of the proposition that Article 81 is a more appropri-
ate remedy when the infant will never attain competence, the court
cited In re Ramos.' 38 Ramos, a 1981 case decided prior to the
enactment of Article 81,139 involved the appointment of co-
conservators of a "hopelessly and irreversibly retarded and
otherwise multiply handicapped" infant, Samuel Ramos. 4 '
Samuel received a $1,600,000 medical malpractice settlement for
physical and medical injuries he sustained. 14' The issue facing the
Ramos court was whether the court should appoint a conservator
for Samuel or proceed with the "usual guardianship proce-
dure.' '142 It is noteworthy that the court does not identify the so-
called "usual guardianship procedure"' 143 for an infant. Instead,
the Ramos court justified employing Article 77 by stating that
"[t]he usual guardianship procedure would be contraindicated since,
136 Id.; see also In re Lavecchia, 650 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
This proposition is demolished by the Lavecchia court's holding that it is
inappropriate to appoint a guardian under Article 81 for an alert and knowledge-
able infant.
117 Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 972. The court refer to language employed in
In re Ramos, 445 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (stating that Article 78.12
of the Mental Hygiene Law must be used because the infant, upon reaching his
legal maturity, will not be able to care for himself or his property).
' 445 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
"9 Id at 892. The Ramos opinion was decided under N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE
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concededly, plaintiff upon reaching his legal majority will not be
able to care for himself or his property, thus conservatorship would
• . . provide the proper vigilance to insure maximum protection of
the rights and interests of the plaintiff.""' The Marmol court's
adamant defense of Ramos as mandatory precedent is troublesome
for two reasons. First, Ramos was decided under Article 77,145
which, due to its inadequacy, was repealed by Article 81.146
Article 77 was repealed because it inadequately provided for the
individual needs of an incapacitated person. Because of this
inadequacy, the Ramos solution does not afford infants heightened
security and protection, and is improper. This shortcoming of
Article 77 was recognized by the Marmol court in its acknowledge-
ment that the guardianship was not narrowly tailored to Adonis
Pineda's needs.
Second, the Marmol court's reliance on Ramos is faulty because
nothing in C.PL.R. 12 precludes its use for a child, such as
Adonis, who is permanently incapacitated. Because C.P.L.R. 12
was an available remedy for Adonis, the court's implication that the
only means to secure Adonis's funds was through Article 81
guardianship was false. The Ramos decision should not have been
used as controlling precedent in the face of contrary law under
C.P.L.R. 12.
Instead, the Marmol court should have employed C.P.L.R. 12
to protect Adonis' funds based on the rationale of Mills v
Durst.147 In Mills, the New York Supreme Court ruled that a
supplemental needs trust 148 ("SNT") could be created for a
144 Id.
145 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77 (McKinney 1988) (repealed 1993)
(outlining the procedure for the appointment of a conservator).
146 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81 (McKinney 1997); see generally supra
Part I (discussing the history of Article 81).
147 594 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
148 A supplemental needs trust ("SNT") is a trust:
generally established with the resources of third parties, such as parents
of disabled children or children of aging parents. Because they are
established with third party resources, the Medicaid transfer of assets
rules do not apply if the aged or disabled person applies for Medicaid
benefits. There is now legislation permitting the establishment of a
[SNT] using the person's own funds, if certain requirements are met,
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permanently incapacitated infant under C.P.L.R. 1206(c).' 49 The
SNT would restrict the guardian's control over the infant's funds
even past the age of majority.50 The Mills court argued that the
SNT did not differ in any significant degree from those require-
ments specifically set forth in the statute.' Therefore, both the
holding in Mills and the plain meaning of C.PL.R. 1206 refute the
Marmol rationale that the only remedies available to protect the
infant's funds beyond majority are those pursuant to Article 81. By
this reasoning, the Marmol court should have proceeded under
C.P.L.R. 12.
The appointment of a guardian for a minor also defies the
legislative intent of Article 81. Ironically, the Marmol court fully
recognized this fact in its reasoning by stating, "the purpose of
Article 81 . . . was to create a guardianship law to meet the needs
of elderly persons afflicted with the various, too-bountiful ills that
flesh is heir to."' 52 Despite this affirmation of Article 81 as a
guardianship law for the elderly, the Marmol court held that
because Adonis Pineda would never attain competence, "[t]he
instant petition presents [the] rare instance of the relatively new
statute being applied to a minor."' 53
which usually provide that at the person's death, Medicaid must be
paid back the amount of benefits expended by the Medicaid program.
Beane, supra note 1, at 269; see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-
1.12 (McKinney 1997) (outlining the procedures for establishing a SNT for
persons with severe and chronic or persistent disabilities).
149 Mills, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
"o C.P.L.R. 12 outlines the procedure a guardian must follow in order to
withdraw funds held in trust for the incapacitated infant. In addition, the court,
under C.P.L.R. 1206(c) can approve a settlement that includes a trust which
continues payment into that trust past the age of majority. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1206
(McKinney 1997); see also Mills, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
'5' See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1206.
152 In re Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
153 id.
329
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
The Marmol decision is also improper because Articles 17154
and 17-A,'55 as well as C.RL.R. 12, provide for well-established
guardianship proceedings for infant incapacitated persons. The
Marmol court could have commenced this proceeding under
Articles 17 and 17-A of the S.C.P.A. because the Legislature
specifically enacted the statute to provide substantive and procedur-
al mechanisms for the protection of infants, 156 persons who are
mentally retarded'57 and persons who are "developmentally
disabled."15 8 Because Articles 17 and 17-A establish with
specificity the procedural and substantive methods of a guardian-
ship proceeding specifically tailored to the needs of a minor, 5 9
154 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 17 (McKinney 1997) (outlining the
procedures for the appointment of a guardian of the person and property of an
infant).
' N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 17-A (McKinney 1997) (outlining the
procedures for the appointment of a guardian of the person and property of a
mentally retarded infant).
156 See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1701 (McKinney 1997) (stating that
"[t]he court has power over the property of an infant and is authorized and
empowered to appoint a guardian ... of an infant whether or not the parent or
parents of the infant are living").
157 See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1759 (McKinney 1997) (stating that
"such guardianship [of a mentally retarded and developmentally disabled person]
shall not terminate at the age of majority or marriage of such mentally retarded
or developmentally disabled person."). Section 1759 is a key section in refuting
the four courts' argument that an Article 81 proceeding is necessary when an
infant incapacitated person is profoundly retarded and will never achieve
competence, because it counters the Ramos rationale that an Article 81
proceeding is the sole means to protect an infant's funds past majority.
158 Id.
159 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1750-a (McKinney 1997) (outlining the
appointment procedure); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1751 (McKinney 1997)
(describing the petition for appointment of a guardian in procedural terms); N.Y.
SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1752 (McKinney 1997) (describing the petition for
appointment of a guardian in substantive terms including, but not limited to, the
content of the petition); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1754 (McKinney 1997)
(addressing how the court should proceed in the event that parents abandon their
incapacitatedchildren). These sections of S.C.P.A. Article 17-A clearly show that
the Legislature drafted and amended the statute to accommodate every situation
that could arise in an infant guardianship. Cf N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81
(mandating that the court should use the least restrictive form of intervention to
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it is entirely unnecessary and a blatant misinterpretation of New
York State's Guardianship Law, to commence an infant guardian-
ship proceeding under Article 81.
Because Article 81 is not tailored to the needs of a child,
commencing an Article 81 guardianship for an infant does the
infant a disservice by creating greater opportunity for neglect and
abuse of the system. 6 ° Conversely, Articles 17 and 17-A are
well-reasoned provisions enacted for the protection of minors, and
therefore guardianship proceedings are more appropriately com-
menced under these articles because they are narrowly tailored to
the needs of an incapacitated infant. The Marmol court erred in
applying Article 81 to minors rather than the statutes drafted
specifically for that purpose. The fact that the Marmol court relied
on the reasoning that "nothing in [Article 81] precludes its use for
accommodate the needs of an incapacitatedperson). The Article 81 mandate does
not address everyday situations such as the one cited in section 1754 of the
S.C.P.A, where an incapacitated infant is abandoned by his or her parent. This
is the crux of the problem with employing Article 81. Because Article 81 does
not establish guidelines for an infant's guardianship proceeding, the guardian for
the incapacitated child has greater flexibility. This flexibility is troublesome in
cases such as Marmol where the guardian attempts to obtain court approval to
withdraw funds that an incapacitatedinfant has receivedin a medical malpractice
settlement. In Marmol, the court allowed the proceeding to be held under Article
81 under the shaky rationale that Article 81 would serve the infant incapacitated
child who would unfortunately never regain capacity. 640 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972
(Sup. Ct. 1996). This is a mere pretext. Section 1759 of the S.C.P.A. provides
for cases where the infant never would regain consciousness. See N.Y. SURR. CT.
PROC. ACT § 1759. The real reason that courts bring proceedings under Article
81 is flexibility and freedom from the specific rules of S.C.P.A. Articles 17 and
17-A, and C.P.L.R. 12 which address step-by-step procedures for the appoint-
ment of a guardian of an incapacitated infant.
160 Justice Kasoff, a Queens County Supreme Court Justice responsible for
hearing cases brought under Article 81, has commented on this overlap. KASOFF,
supra note 30, § 10:81, at 459. Justice Kasoff writes: "[a]lthough the two articles
[S.C.P.A. and Article 81] do not track one another in scope, the 'overriding
criteria' of Article 81-its mandate to have the court invoke only the 'least
restrictive form of intervention on the individual's life'-has been found equally
applicable to Article 17-A." KASOFF, supra note 30, § 10:81, at 459. Justice
Kasoff's commentary illustrates that Article 17-A is more inclusive than Article
81.
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the young" 6 ' does nothing to rebut this argument and reveals its
logically flawed reasoning. Because the Marmol court misconstrued
the legislative intent and the plain meaning of Article 81 and failed
to recognize the availability of other well-established remedies,
Adonis Pineda was not provided adequate security over his
settlement.
C. An Analysis of In re Lavecchia
The third case of significance, In re Lavecchia,162 involved an
Article 81 proceeding to appoint a guardian for a thirteen year-old
rendered quadriplegic 1 63 as the result of injuries sustained in an
automobile accident. 64 The proceeding was initiated pursuant to
Article 81 despite the fact that the infant was "alert, knowledgeable,
articulate and [understood] the nature of [the] proceeding."'' 65 In
contrast to Le, the Lavecchia court correctly converted the Article
81 proceeding into an Article 17 claim because the infant was
capable of competence upon attaining majority.16 6 Moreover, the
court held that "the purpose of Article 81 .. .was to address the
decision-making needs of disabled older adults . . . . It was not
intended as an alternative to existing statutes ... under Articles 17
and 17-A."'
167
The Lavecchia opinion recognized that appointment of a
guardian for the incapacitated infant was necessary because the
infant was likely to suffer harm since she was unable to provide for
her personal needs and property management.168 The court found
that "in the case of an infant who is physically disabled, an Article
17 guardianship proceeding is the more appropriate proceeding to
appoint a guardian than an Article 81 Mental Hygiene Law
161 Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
162 650 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
163 Id. at 956.
164 id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 957.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 956.
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guardianship proceeding." '169 The Lavecchia court refused to
apply Article 81 because existing statutes developed to safeguard
infants were available. 170 The precedent set by the Lavecchia
court recognized that Article 81 was not intended as an alternative
to existing statutes governing infants. Instead, it established that an
Article 81 proceeding in the case of an infant was inappropri-
ate. 171
D. An Analysis of In re Addo.72
In re Addo is the most recent reported case involving the
commencement of a proceeding under Article 81. In Addo, the
court considered whether to appoint parents as co-guardians for
their seven year-old brain-damaged son, Mark Irving Addo, who
had won a medical malpractice settlement. 173 Mark suffered brain
damage and resulting cerebral atrophy, seizure disorder and mental
retardation at or about the time of his birth. 74 Because Mark's
injuries were permanent and his prognosis was disability for life,
the court employed a similar rationale as that used in Marmol to
circumvent the use of C.PL.R. 12.175 The Addo court reasoned
that "since Mark is not expected to reach competency upon
attaining majority, the settlement funds will be held under Article
81 to insure maximum protection.' ' 176 Therefore, ignoring the
precedent set in Lavecchia,177 the Addo court ruled that a
169 Id. at 957.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 In re Addo, N.Y.L.J., Sept, 30, 1997, at 26 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
173 Id.
174 Id.
17I Id. (stating that the petitioner [parent of the incapacitated child] could
have chosen relief under C.P.L.R. 12). The Addo court dismissed the fact that the
appropriate proceeding exists under C.P.L.R. 12 by reiterating the Ramos opinion
that "only in the rare case where an infant is not expected to reach competence
upon attaining his majority are these funds held under Article 81 to insure
maximum protection." Id. (citing In re Ramos, 445 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (Sup. Ct.
1981)).
176 Addo, N.Y.L.J., Sep. 30, 1997, at 26.
... In re Lavecchia, 650 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that a
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proceeding for the appointment of a guardian of the property of an
infant was appropriate under Article 81.11
8
The Addo court's decision to hold the infant's funds under
Article 81 was improper for three reasons. First, because Article 81
was designed for an elderly person with a relatively short life-span,
the guardian under Article 81 has greater access to the incapacitated
person's funds. This reflects the court's view that invasion of the
elderly person's assets was a reality of advanced age. Additionally,
once the principal estate is depleted, the elderly person becomes
eligible for Medicare.179 Conversely, a court employing C.P.L.R.
12 on behalf of an infant, views invasion of the infant's principal
as a circumstance to be avoided. 8' By this reasoning, C.P.L.R.
proceeding commenced under Article 81 for an incapacitated infant should be
converted to a proceeding under S.C.P.A. 17 or 17-A).
178 Addo, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1997, at 26.
'9 Subchapter XVIII of the Social Security Act provides a health insurance
plan for people 65 and older. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1998). See also Lenise Dolan,
The Lawyer, the GCM, the Forest and the Trees.- Long Term Care Issues, in
GUARDIANSHIP LAW: ARTICLE 81 1997 TRAINING TO OBTAIN CERTIFICATION
1997, 143, 156 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. D-
258, 1997). Medicare is a federal program administered by the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services; enrollment is managed by the Social Security
Administration. Id. at 156.
"So See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Tremaine, 37 F. Supp. 177, 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1940) (ruling that a petition for withdrawal of an infant's funds should
contain (1) a full explanation of the reason for the withdrawal; (2) several sworn
statements by qualified persons of the estimated costs of the proposed expendi-
tures and the necessity of the work to be done; (3) the infant's age; (4) the
amounts and date withdrawn the infant and parent; (5) the amount on hand and
earned income; (6) a recital of previous withdrawals and the reasons therefor; (7)
a recital of the financial circumstances of the infant's family; (8) a statement that
the expenditure cannot be afforded by the infant's family; (9) the nature of the
infant's injury and present state of health; and (10) any other facts material to the
application); Hilgarth v. Costello, 506 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (Sup. Ct. 1986)
(denying petition to permit withdrawal of funds deposited in savings bank
pursuant to infant's compromise order for purpose of transferring funds to tax
deferred insurance annuity that would earn higher rate of interest, because tax
deferred annuities are not among devices enumerated in C.P.L.R. 1206 that may
be used for investment of such proceeds so as to guard against risk of depletion).
See also In re Stackpole, 168 N.Y.S.2d 495, 499 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (denying
parent's application to withdraw funds to pay tuition for a religious high school
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12 preserves the infants' principal sums until they attain majority,
and if necessary, beyond majority.'8 ' Moreover, under C.P.L.R.
12, adequate protection of the infant's interests is secured because
the infant's funds can only be withdrawn upon order of the
court.'8 2 For example, by employing Article 81 instead of
C.PL.R. 12, the court awarded the mother of Mark Addo a
$25,000 salary as compensation as his care giver. 183 The guard-
ian-mother would never have received such compensation under
C.P.L.R. 1206(c), which has strict guidelines regarding the
management of an infant's funds. 184 In contrast, Article 81 does
from proceeds of infant's cause of action for personal injuries, notwithstanding
father's financial inability to meet payment).
t See cases cited supra note 180.
182 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1206(c) (McKinney 1997).
183 Mrs. Addo originally petitioned the court for a salary of $45,000 to
provide care giver services to her son. Addo, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1997, at 26. Cf
Donato v. Gonzalo, 546 N.Y.S.2d 278, 280 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (denying application
for withdrawal of funds from infant's bank accounts established pursuant to court
order with proceeds of settlement of medical malpractice action, in order to
reimburse infant's father for purchase of computer equipment and software for
infant, because such items were not related to injuries suffered by infant). Donato
provides an instructive contrast to the Addo ruling. By the reasoning presented
in a case brought under C.P.L.R. 12, such as Donato, the mother-guardian in
Addo would never have been allowed to receive a $25,000 yearly salary as
compensation for the care of her child, who was in school for the majority of the
day. Similar to the computer equipment in Donato, compensation to the mother
in Addo for ordinary care for her child is not related to the injuries suffered by
the infant.
184 C.P.L.R. 1206(c) states:
[T]he court may order that money constituting any part of the property
be deposited in one or more specified insured banks or trust companies
or savings banks or insured state or federal credit unions or be invested
in one or more specified accounts in insured savings and loan
associations, or it may order that a structured settlement agreement be
executed, which shall include any settlement whose terms contain
provisions for the payment of funds on an installment basis, provided
that with respect to future installment payments, the court may order
that each party liable for such payments shall fund such payments, in
an amount necessary to assure the future payments, in the form of an
annuity contract executed by a qualified insurer and approved by the
superintendent of insurance pursuant to articles fifty-A and fifty-B of
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not provide explicit guidelines for the management of an incapaci-
tated person's funds.
1 85
this chapter. The court may elect that the money be deposited in a high
interest yield account such as an insured "savings certificate" or an
insured "money market" account. The court may further elect to invest
the money in one or more insured or guaranteed United States treasury
or municipal bills, notes or bonds. This money is subject to withdrawal
only upon order of the court, except that no court order shall be
required to pay over to the infant who has attained the age of eighteen
years all moneys so held unless the depository is in receipt of an order
from a court of competent jurisdiction directing it to withhold such
payment beyond the infant's eighteenth birthday. Notwithstanding the
preceding sentence, the ability of an infant who has attained the age of
eighteen years to accelerate the receipt of future installment payments
pursuant to a structured settlement agreement shall be governed by the
terms of such agreement.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1206(c).
.85 Section 81.21(a) of the Mental Hygiene Law states that:
[T]hose powers which may be granted [to a guardian] include, but are
not limited to, the power to: 1. make gifts; 2. provide support for
persons dependent upon the incapacitated person for support, whether
or not the incapacitated person is legally obligated to provide for that
support; 3. convey or release contingent and expectant interests in
property, including marital rights and any right of survivorship
incidental to joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety; 4. exercise or
release powers held by the incapacitated person as trustee, personal
representative, guardian for minor, guardian, or donee of a power of
appointment; 5. enter into contracts; 6. create revocable or irrevocable
trusts of property of the estate which may extend beyond the incapacity
or life of the incapacitated person; 7. exercise options of the incapaci-
tated person to purchase securities or other property; 8. exercise rights
to elect options and change beneficiaries under insurance and annuity
policies and to surrender the policies for their cash value; 9. exercise
any right to an elective share in the estate of the incapacitatedperson's
deceased spouse; renounce or disclaim any interest by testate or
intestate succession or by inter vivos transfer consistent with paragraph
(c) of section 2-1.11 of the estates, powers and trusts law; 11. authorize
access to or release of confidential records; and 12. apply for govern-
ment or private benefits.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(a) (McKinney 1997). A comparison of
C.P.L.R. 12 and Article 81 indicates that C.P.L.R. 12 is a statute outlining a
guardian's restrictions, whereas Article 81 outlines the affirmative powers that
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Second, an Article 81 proceeding to appoint a guardian for
a child is improper because the infant's parents are responsible for
the care and expenses of their child. 186 In a C.P.L.R. 12 proceed-
ing, the court is mindful that there exists a legal duty of a parent
to support a child until that child attains majority.18 7 Accordingly,
the court in a C.P.L.R. 12 proceeding is protective of the infant's
funds.188 By contrast, under Article 81, there is no safeguard for
a child's funds because it is the guardian, not the court, that has
control over the incapacitated person's funds. 189 Under Article 81
there is no need for a court order for every disbursement, as there
is with C.PL.R. 12, because the guardian has control of the
checkbook and can make disbursements independent of a court
order.9 ° In fact, the guardian is even paid a commission on these
disbursements.191
Third, the Addo decision is contrary to public policy because it
mandates that Mark Addo pay his mother a salary, simply for being
his mother, from funds awarded to him as compensation for his
a guardian has with respect to the incapacitated person's funds. See id.; N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 12.
186 See, e.g., Gaffney v. Constantine, 87 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (Sup. Ct. 1949)
(stating that it is the legal duty of parents to provide for their minor children).
187 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1206; see also Gaffney, 87 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
181 See generally Joseph S. Mattina, Guardianship Funds in Erie County: A
Proposal for Investment Flexibility with Security, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 50 (1997).
The Honorable Joseph S. Mattina, Surrogate of Erie County, N.Y. is responsible
for appointing the parent or other responsible adult to be the guardian of the
property of an infant. Id. Judge Mattina states that in employing C.P.L.R. 12,
"[t]he court's first priority in determining the type of investments that may be
purchased for guardianship accounts has been the safety of the principal." Id.
89 See generally Bailly, supra note 5, at 3-5. Article 81 guardians marshall
and collect all known accounts of the incapacitated person and deposit them into
interest bearing guardianship accounts. The guardian has control over the
incapacitated person's funds and makes disbursements on behalf of the
incapacitated person. Bailly, supra note 5, at 5-6.
190 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the
guardian of the property has control over the incapacitatedperson's bank account
and can make disbursements from the guardianship account).
191 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 2309 (McKinney 1997) (providing the
calculation for the payment of commissions to the guardian from the Guardian-
ship account).
337
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
injuries. 92 The Addo court's $25,000 per year award defies an
avalanche of precedent standing for the principle that it is the duty
of a father and mother to feed and clothe their children.' 93 Infants
cannot be required to even buy themselves clothing from the money
awarded to them for injuries sustained. 194 "[T]he law is clear that
the fund must be preserved for the infant's benefit when he attains
majority. Exceptions are proper when the income and assets of the
parents are not sufficient to provide for [the infant's] needs.'
195
The court, in employing the term "needs," refers to "surgical,
medical, or dental expenses."'' 96 Therefore, exceptions are only
proper for expenditures which are a direct result of the accident; in
short, expenses which would not have occurred "but for" the
accident. By this reasoning, the court's granting Mrs. Addo a salary
for her services as mother was improper. "While Mrs. Addo aids
Mark with his toiletry and dressing in the morning, thereafter from
8:30 [a.m.] to 3:30 [p.m.], while Mark is at school she has no
contact with Mark."' 97 The record affirmatively showed that Mrs.
Addo spent the same amount of time caring for Mark as she did for
her healthy children. The Addo court defied a hundred years of case
law by ignoring the fact that "although the guardian, as a fiduciary,
is responsible for the care and management of the ward, the court
must make the ultimate decision as to what is in the best interest
of the child."' 98 In the Addo case, the ward's parents had the
resources to support their child; therefore, the court should not have
awarded Mrs. Addo a salary for services she was legally bound to
perform. In this regard, the court in Gaffney v Constantine noted
that:
[The] court is the guardian of [an infant's funds] and when
the child reaches twenty-one, he has a right to expect to
receive the money awarded to him for his injury with
192 In re Addo, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1997, at 26 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
193 Seesupra note 183 and accompanyingtext (discussing the duty of parents
to safeguard their children financially).
... See Gaffney v. Constantine, 87 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
'9' In re Curry, 491 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219 (Sur. Ct. 1985).
196 Id.
197 Addo, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 30, 1997, at 26.
198 Id.
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interest and not a bundle of court orders showing that his
funds were spent for ordinary necessities of life which
others [parent-guardians] were obligated by law to furnish
to him. [Parents] must feed and clothe [their] children.'99
Therefore, because it is the duty of the parents to provide support
for their children, and it is against public policy to pay the mother
of an infant a salary for caring for her own child, courts should not
commence Article 81 guardianship proceedings for minors under
the statute as currently enacted.
V RECOMMENDATIONS
Should New York courts continue their trend of judicial
activism by employing Article 81 for infants, as seems likely, the
Legislature must amend Article 81 to explicitly exclude or include
children within the meaning of "persons." For such an amendment
to be effective, it must include provisions addressing the unique
needs of children, such as education, day care and the psychologi-
cal needs of developing children.
Several aspects of Article 81 should also be specifically
amended to safeguard the rights of minors. First, the Legislature
should amend Article 81 to mandate that guardianship training °°
199 Gaffney, 87 N.Y.S.2d at 132 (denying petition of an unemployed father
to withdraw funds from son's personal injury settlement); see also Demarco v.
Seaman, 283 N.Y.S. 697, 698 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (holding that parents may not
withdraw money from awards held for their children to compensate them for
their pain and suffering).
200 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.39 (McKinney 1997) (outlining
guardian education requirements). "Each person appointed by the court to be a
guardian must complete a training program approved by the chief administrator."
Jd. § 81.39(b). The importance of this provision is that in the guardianship
training session, the guardian is trained with respect to his or her legal duties and
responsibilities as well as all the available resources for the health and well-being
of the incapacitated person. These resources only include directories of centers
on aging. This must be amended to reflect the fact that a guardian in the training
class may be charged with the care of a minor. But again, the fact that
guardianship training classes do not address the needs of the infant points to the
fact that the Legislature never intended the statute to extend to minors. This
brings to the forefront the issue that a guardian of an infant incapacitatedperson
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focus on issues dealing with minors. Currently, guardianship
training covers the legal duties of a guardian,2 °1 the rights of an
incapacitated person, °2 the available resources to assist an inca-
pacitated person, 203 an orientation to medical terminology 2 4 and
the preparation of annual reports. 20 5 Existing guardianship train-
ing sessions also provide the guardian with information about
Medicare, nursing homes, 206 protective services for adults,
20 7
Social Security and other resources that are of special concern to
the elderly.20 8 However, children have different developmental
needs from the elderly in such areas as education, day care, and
psychological care. It is counterproductive to have a guardian of the
person and property of an infant incapacitated person undergo
training geared towards the needs of the elderly. If the court insists
on applying Article 81 to children, then dual guardianship training
programs must be created to address the drastically different needs
is not properly trained under Article 81 training classes. This may have a
negative impact on the child if the available resources to aid the infant are un-
known.
201 Id. § 81.39(b)(1).
202 Id. § 81.39(b)(2).
203 Id. § 81.39(b)(3). For example, guardianship training sessions distribute
information to guardians on how they may obtain information from the New
York City Department for the Aging regarding benefits available for people sixty
and over. See Dolan, supra note 179, at 169.
204 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.39(b)(4) (McKinney 1997).
205 Id. § 81.39(b)(5).
206 Nursing homes are residential health care facilitates offering twenty-four
hour services including skilled nursing, complete assistance with activities of
daily living as well as other skilled therapies, predominantly for older adults. See
Dolan, supra note 179, at 156.
207 Protective services for adults are "services provided to people under Title
XX who have no one responsibly able to assist them, and who, because of either
physical or mental impairment are unable to meet their essential needs." See
Dolan, supra note 179, at 156.
208 See Dolan, supra note 179, at 146. Guardianship training classes stress
the fact that the best plan for an elderly incapacitated person is one which
"consults the preferences of the elders and their adult children; harmonizes them
as much as possible, and brings all the local practical resources (of Medicare,
Medicaid, insurance, voluntary organizations, and the private sector) into play."
Dolan, supra note 179, at 146. Again, mention of the needs of incapacitated
children is absent throughout the guardianship training literature.
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of children and the elderly. In addition, an infant incapacitated
person has the benefit of a longer life span in which technology
and medical improvements may one day eliminate the infant's need
for a guardian. This reality can best be addressed in a specialized
infant guardianship program.
Second, Article 81 should be amended to create a hybrid statute
combining its mandate of a guardianship structure focusing on the
incapacitated person's need for autonomy with C.PL.R. 12's
insistence on protecting the principal of an infant's funds. Under
such a hybrid statute, New York courts would have the versatility
of Article 8 1's requirement that the guardian provide the ward with
a narrowly tailored guardianship, coupled with the stipulation that
all the infants' funds may only be withdrawn by court order.
Third, should the courts continue to allow infant guardian-
ship proceedings to be commenced pursuant to Article 81, then the
Legislature should adopt mediation as an alternative to the
inherently adversarial nature20 9 of an Article 81 hearing. 10 In
determining whether mediation would be appropriate in the
guardianship context, the Legislature should refer to the successes
mediation has had in the field of child custody. Child custody
hearings are analogous to Article 81 proceedings in that neither
result in final judgments of right or wrong. Rather, the goal of both
Article 81 and child custody proceedings is to arrive at a compro-
mise that maintains a continuing relationship between the parties.
Mediation is a viable tool in an Article 81 proceeding because it
eliminates the animosity fostered by litigation and empowers parties
to resolve disputes in a cooperative manner.21 Moreover, the
adversarial nature of Article 81 proceedings have been found to
have "devastating psychological, social and economic effects on the
209 In order for a petitioner to prevail in a guardianship proceeding, there
must be clear and convincing evidence that "the person is unable to provide for
personal needs and/or property management; and the person cannot adequately
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of such inability." N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(b)(l)-(2) (McKinney 1997).
210 See Julie Michaels Keegan, Court-Referred Guardianship Mediation: A
Practical Alternative to Article 81 Proceedings, ELDER LAW ATT'Y, Fall, 1997,
at 53, 55 (1997) (outlining the benefits of mediation in the guardianship context).
211 Id. at 55.
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parties [families], while creating significant cost to the courts. '
Mediation would be most successful at remedying the economic
implications of applying Article 81 to an infant guardianship
proceeding.
The potential that mediation has for change in the infant
guardianship context is immense. A case study which illuminates
the necessity of mediation is found in the Marmol situation. By a
1997 memorandum decision, the court granted a motion by the
guardian of the property of Adonis Pineda, Rebecca Rawson, to
withdraw from Adonis' funds $57,531.50 for guardian services
rendered from August 1, 1996 through January 31, 1997. This was
not the first fee application granted to Ms. Rawson by the court.
Since the date of her appointment as guardian through August 1,
1996, Ms. Rawson received $80,346.50. The mother of the infant,
Allison Marmol, objected to this fee arrangement. The decision
stated: "Ms. Marmol voices her fear that Adonis' assets are being
seriously eroded by the fee demands of the guardian of the
property."2" 3 Adonis' mother further contended that "if the fee
structure and Ms. Rawson's present application remain unmodified
... the cost of Ms. Rawson's services will represent the largest
single yearly depletion of Adonis' assets, far surpassing the cost of
his education, therapies and other services. ' 14 In fact, the memo-
randum decision highlights the fact that Mrs. Marmol, upon
learning that every telephone communication made to Ms. Rawson
was billed to the estate, resolved to stop calling Rawson.2"5
The breakdown in communication illustrated by the Marmol
decision is exactly the scenario that mediation would resolve. In the
mediation process billing procedures would be anticipated and
explained. By contrast, the Marmol court did not anticipate the
harm its misuse of Article 81 would have on Adonis' future.
212 Id. at 53.
213 Motion by the Guardian of the Property of Adonis Pineda and Cross-
motion by the Guardian of the Person at 12, In re Marmol, 640 N.Y.S.2d 969
(Sup. Ct. 1996) (No. 500113/95).
214 Id.
215 Id.
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The court stated:
It was not anticipated by this court at the time of the Order
setting the rate of compensation for the guardian that the
need for her services would be as extensive as they are and
would generate billings of such magnitude. Adonis receives
$98,218.75 semi-annually, for a yearly income of
$196,437.50. The total value of the settlement in his
personal injury action is approximately $5 million. He
currently has in his account $700,000. This is the same
amount that was in his account in February 1996. Thus, his
entire annual income has been consumed by expenses, over
half of which constitute guardianship fees. If the cost of
the guardianship of the property consumes half or more of
Adonis' annual income, it could be tenably argued that the
very purpose of such guardianship has been defeated; that
the child's annual funds would be doubled at one stroke
with the elimination of the very services intended to
protect his income.
16
Under the process of mediation the basic misunderstandings
between the parties in a guardianship proceeding, such as attorney's
billing procedures for telephone calls, would never arise because
there would be an open line of communication between all parties.
In addition, mediation in the infant guardianship context would
create a more comfortable environment whereby the parties could
more effectively outline the needs of the child.217 Moreover,
mediation is a less costly alternative to litigation."1 8 Consequent-
ly, the infant would be left with a larger settlement upon attaining
majority."'
The use of mediation in the infant guardianship context offers
an alternative to litigation that would focus on the needs of the
child in a more affordable and timely manner.22 ° Therefore,
should the court's trend of judicial activism continue, the process
216 Id. at 12-13.
2 7 Keegan, supra note 210, at 55.
28 Keegan, supra note 210, at 56.
29 Keegan, supra note 210, at 56.
220 Keegan, supra note 210, at 56.
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of mediation must be employed to further safeguard the rights of
the minor.22" '
CONCLUSION
The plain meaning and legislative intent of Article 81 affirma-
tively establishes that the statute was designed as a procedure for
the appointment of a guardian to meet the personal and/or property
management needs of elderly incapacitated persons. The history of
Article 81 provides concrete evidence that the Legislature never
intended infant guardianship proceedings to be commenced under
the statute. Furthermore, the needs of children were never ad-
dressed in legislative debates and studies. As a result, Article 81 is
ill-equipped to deal with infant guardianship issues and care.
It is therefore evident that New York courts must reject the
precedent of Marmol and accept Lavecchia as the proper disposi-
tion of child guardianship proceedings. The Lavecchia court,
recognizing the inappropriateness of using Article 81 for infants,
converted the matter into a proceeding under S.C.PA. Article 17.
Furthermore, New York courts must dispense with blindly
employing Ramos for the proposition that Article 81 is the only
alternative when an infant will never reach competency upon
attaining majority.
Courts must also carefully review C.PL.R. 12 as a viable
alternative for holding permanently incapacitated infant's funds.
Comparatively, Article 81 affords only weak protection of these
funds. As a result, the Addo court allowed an incapacitated infant's
mother to collect a $25,000 annual salary merely for being the
child's mother. This incongruous result ignores the fact that the
funds of this child are compensation for pain and suffering as well
as for his maintenance upon attaining majority. The child alone is
entitled to all of the money from his settlement and C.PL.R. 12
protects that principle.
The Addo case and the recent motions and cross-motions filed
in Marmol are indicative of the changes necessary in infant
guardianship law. New York State Court of Appeals' Chief Judge
2 Keegan, supra note 210, at 55.
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Kaye recently established a Project Task Force to explore the use
of mediation and ADR in the New York Court System in order to
provide litigants with more choices. Although guardianship
proceedings in general, and infant guardianship proceedings in
particular, were not the focus of the Project Task Force study, they
must be brought under this mediation umbrella. The same advo-
cates in the elderlaw community who fought for the repeal of
Articles 77 and 78 must investigate the abuses suffered by children
under Article 81 on a case by case basis with a focus on their
physical, economic and emotional well-being, instead of an analysis
of lifeless court opinions.
Persons who serve as guardians of incapacitated children stand
in a position of trust and confidence. As fiduciaries they have a
duty that must not be compromised. Article 81 proceedings
commenced for minors not only undermine the legitimacy of the
guardian, but strip incapacitated infants of the funds earmarked for
their survival.

